We treat each district's partisanship as an unknown point on a single latent dimension. Our assumption of unidimensionality warrants some brief discussion. District partisanship ranges between two theoretical pure types: a purely Democratic district and a purely Republican district. Each district lies between these two pure types, and hence the latent trait in our model is unidimensional. Were we measuring district ideology, say, using survey data, then a multidimensional latent trait might be more appropriate, but this is not the case. The assumption of unidimensionality is consistent with a long tradition in the study of American electoral politics in which two-party competition is the norm, and the preferences of candidates, parties and voters are represented as points on a single dimension. Examples include characterizations of electoral competition and the two-party system (e.g., Downs 1957; Black 1987; Aldrich 1995) The electoral returns we analyze strongly support the assumption of unidimensionality over the period under study. Table 1 reports the results of an extremely simple first look at the electoral data via principal components analysis (e.g., Joliffe 2002); for each decade, we computed the correlation matrix for the 5 sets of congressional vote shares and 2 or 3 sets of presidential vote shares (all on the log-odds scale), and examined how much variation was accounted for by the first principal component. In every decade, the 1st eigenvalue of the correlation matrix is quite large relative to the number of elections available for analysis (typically greater than 5), and the 2nd eigenvalue is always less than 1.0, strongly suggesting that a single dimension underlies the vote data. Similarly,
is relatively large, ranging from a minimum of 69% in the 1970s data, to 84% in the 1990s data. We also examined the proportion of variation in a given decade's vote shares that is attributable to cross-district or between-district variation (equivalent to the r 2 from a regression of a decade's vote totals on district fixed effects); in each decade it is clear that bulk of the variation in the votes is cross-district variation, with the elections of the 1990s generating the least amount of withindistrict variation, and the 1970s elections generating the most. Thus both theory and data support an assumption that levels of district partisanship can be modelled as points on a unidimensional continuum. 
Proportion Variation Explained

The MCMC algorithm
The MCMC algorithm used to estimate our model is initialized with all parameters set to zero, but with latent district partisanship set to the re-scaled average of Presidential vote in the district. These start values are merely used to initialize the algorithm and are of no substantive consequence; further details appear in the next section. The MCMC algorithm quickly moves away from these start values to generate a random tour of the posterior density. After 25,000 burn-in iterations (letting the algorithm step away from the arbitrary initial values) we run another 250,000 iterations of the MCMC algorithm, saving every 250th iteration to get 1,000 samples from the joint posterior distribution. Trace plots and other diagnostics (available upon request) strongly indicate that the MCMC algorithm had converged on the joint posterior density.
Conditional Distributions for the Gibbs Sampler
For the purposes of this exposition, our model can be re-written generically as follows:
(1) µ ij = c ij γ j + x i β j (2)
where y ij is the log-odds of the Democratic vote share for election j in district i, where i = 1, . . . n and j = 1, . . . , m; c ij is a vector of covariates specific to district i in election j (e.g., home-state indicators, incumbency indicators, etc) plus a constant term, and γ j is a vector of parameters to be estimated, including an election-specific fixed effect (intercept); x i is the latent preference of district i, and β j is a discrimination parameter (equivalent to a factor loading); z i is a vector of district-specific social-structural and demographic aggregates, and α is a vector of unknown parameters; and ν 2 j and σ 2 are unknown variance parameters to be estimated. For ease of exposition, assume there is no missing data. Let Θ denote the complete set of unknown parameters: i.e., Θ = {x, Γ, β, α, ν, σ 2 }, where the vectors and matrices in Θ are formed by stacking the corresponding parameters across elections j = 1, . . . , m.
In the Bayesian approach we adopt, we wish to compute the posterior density of the unknown parameters, p(Θ|Y, Z) = p(x, Γ, β, α, ν, σ 2 |Y, Z, C), where Y, Z and C are matrices formed from y ij , z i , c ij respectively. Via Bayes' Rule, this posterior density is proportional to the prior density over the parameters multiplied by the likelihood, i.e., p(x, Γ, β, α, ν, σ
where p(Θ) is the prior density of the parameters and Θ −x denotes Θ without x. Here we assume that the parameters are a priori independent; i.e., p(Θ) =
As discussed in the text, we use vague normal priors for γ j , β j and α parameters, and diffuse inverse-Gamma priors for the variance parameters ν 2 j and σ 2 . Combined with the normal likelihood for both the y ij and x i , the use of normal and inverse-Gamma priors makes the Bayesian analysis of this model relatively straightforward, at least mathematically: specifically, this is an instance of conjugate Bayesian analysis, in that the posterior densities for all parameters will be in the same family as the corresponding prior density.
The only difficulty here is computational, arising from the fact that the posterior density is highdimensional: n.b., there are as many x i parameters as there are unique House districts in any given decade. We use computationally-intensive, simulation methods (Markov chain Monte Carlo, or MCMC) to explore this density. MCMC algorithms generate random tours of parameter spaces; the output of each iteration of a MCMC algorithm is a set of values for the unknown parameters, a location in the parameter space. When run long enough, and subject to some mild regularity conditions, MCMC algorithms visit regions in the parameter space with frequency proportional to the posterior probability of a given region.
The Gibbs sampler is the workhorse MCMC algorithm. An iteration of the Gibbs sampler consists of a pass over all parameters in the model, sampling from the conditional distribution of each parameter, where the conditioning is on the other parameters in the model and the data: i.e., at iteration t, sample θ , Y, Z), where j indexes a partitioning of Θ into J components. Because of conjugacy, all of these J conditional distributions are either normal or inverse-Gamma distributions, easy to sample from, and with means and variances (or shape and rate parameters, in the case of the Gamma distributions) that are easily computed. For expository purposes, we derive the conditional distribution for the key quantity in our analysis, the latent district partisanship x i .
To derive conditional distributions for a Gibbs sampler, we exploit the following: (1) almost all statistical models (and, in particular, hierarchical models of the sort we use here) can be represented as conditional independence graphs, or directed acyclic graphs (or DAGs); (2) if θ j is a node in DAG G, then its conditional distribution is
where the directed edges in the DAG correspond to parent-to-children relations. We now use this result to derive the conditional distribution of x i . Inspection of equation 1, 2 and 3 indicates that y ij are the children nodes of x i , j = 1, . . . , m, while α and σ 2 are parent nodes of x i . Let w ij = y ij − c ij γ j . Then equation 1 can be re-written as w ij ∼ N (x i β j , ν 2 j ), j = 1, . . . , m, with the w ij children nodes of x i . Then, via equation 4,
where φ is the standard normal probability density function. Note that x i is the regression coefficient in the heteroskedastic regression of the w ij on the β j , j = 1, . . . , m, with the heteroskedasticity arising because of the different variance terms, the ν 2 j . The MLE of x i is thuŝ
with variance j (ν 2 j /β 2 j ). A well-known and frequently-used result in Bayesian statistics is that the product of a normal prior over a regression coefficient and the MLE from a normal-linear regression model is itself a normal distribution with (1) mean equal to the precision-weighted average of the means of each distribution and (2) variance equal to the inverse of the sum of the precisions of each distribution, where precision is defined as the inverse of the variance (e.g., Leamer 1978, Theorem 3.9) . Applying this result means that the conditional distribution for x i in equation 5 is a normal distribution with mean
and variance
Similar derivations yield the conditional distributions for the other parameters in the model.
Post-Processing the Gibbs Sampler Output
As written, the model in equations 1 through 3 is not identified. In particular, any re-scaling of x i yields the same value of the likelihood via offsetting re-scalings of the β j parameters: i.e., since
2 ), we can re-write µ ij = c ij γ j + (z i α + i )β j , where var( i ) = σ 2 . Note that for any (α, σ 2 , β), we can obtain the same value of µ ij with the re-scaled parameters α * = gα, σ 2 * = g 2 σ 2 and β * j = β j /g, for any g = 0. Likewise, consider a translation of the x i via an additive change in the α j to α *
, via an offsetting additive shift in the intercept parameter contained in γ * j (the election-specific fixed effect); i.e., with
. . , m. We actually ignore this lack of identification when implementing the Gibbs sampler for our model. We impose local identification by post-processing the output of the Gibbs sampler. Specifically, we impose the identifying constraint that the x i have mean zero and standard deviation one across districts, removing the indeterminacy due to scale and translation discussed above.
2 We impose this constraint as follows. At iteration t of the Gibbs sampler: (1) center and scale the x (t) i to have unit variance: i.e.,x
j a, j = 1, . . . , m. It is a simple exercise to verify that µ
i ; i.e., we generate the same likelihood contributions as provided by the original model, but from a set of identified parameters. Thus, over many iterations, the transformed values then constitute samples from the joint posterior density defined on the space of identified parameters. Figure 1 presents trace plots for selected parameters (and pairs of parameters) in the space of unidentified parameters. In the upper left of Figure 1 is the trace of the mean and standard deviation of latent district preferences in the 1990s data: since latent district partisanship has no "natural" scale, neither of these quantities is identified. Figure 2 presents traces in the space of identified parameters, by imposing the mean zero, variance one restriction. It is apparent that the Gibbs sampler is much better behaved in the space of identified parameters. All inferences, graphs and tables in the body of the paper are summaries of the posterior density of the identified parameters.
Validity of the Latent Trait: Member Ideal Points
This section considers some additional validity measures for our latent district partisanship measure. In particular, we display the relationship between latent district partisanship and member ideal points in each decade from 1950-1980 in figure 3 , the analogous results for the 1990s are included in the paper. Figure 3 produces similar graphs from the other four decades we examine. These graphs makes clear the way that roll call voting in the House of Representatives has become increasingly polarized along partisan lines since the 1950s. While this is a compelling and graphically vivid feature of the roll call data, our interest lies in the validating our district partisanship measure. We note that in all decades, there is moderate to very strong relationship between district partisanship and the recovered ideal point of the district's representative. An important exception to this general pattern comes in the 87th House (1961-62) , which we use to validate the estimates of district partisanship (1950s, 1960s, 1970s and 1980s) and four Congress immediately following each respective decade: the 87th House ; the 92nd , the 97th (1981-92) and the 102nd . Vertical and horizontal lines indicate 95% credible intervals for legislative preferences and district partisanship, respectively. for the 1950s. In this particular comparison (top left, Figure 3 ) Democrats representing districts in the South record voting histories that bear no relationship to the levels of partisanship we estimate in their districts, a finding that will come as no surprise to scholars of American politics. Put simply, high levels of Democratic partisanship did not translate into reliably "liberal" voting histories for Southern Democrats; conversely, the ideological and policy
Estimates of District Level Partisanship
Figures 4 through 8 show scatterplot of the recovered latent trait and its indicators (presidential and congressional vote shares) for the 1990s. The relationship between the vote shares and the latent trait is as expected. The non-linearities follow from the fact we use log-odds transformations of the vote shares. Outliers are generally more prevalent in the congressional elections scatterplots, resulting from the fact that indicators for incumbency, challenger quality and region (south/nonsouth) also appear in the measurement model for those elections
Out of Step Members
In the text of the paper, we had a brief discussion of the mebers from the 107th Congress who were "out of step" with their district. Remember that we define "out of step" members as follows. Suppose we break the distribution of district partisanship at its mean value of zero, labelling districts to the left of this point "Republican" districts and districts to the right as "Democratic". If a Republican member represents a "Democratic" district or vice-versa, we call this member out of step. Here, we provide a listing of the out of step members, and give their fates through the 2006 election.
Extension: A Model of District Preferences
In the paper, we built a model of district partisanship using demographic indicators and vote shares. However, for some purposes, this may not be enough: scholars might want to explicitly examine district preferences to, say, study representation (Bartels 2002) . Our model can accommodate such a request by incorporating additional indicators measuring ideology. In this section, we use survey data aggregated to the district level to provide a measure of ideology.
The type of survey data typically available to most political scientists would be inadequate for this task. As we discussed in the paper, using survey data to study district opinion typically suffers from the "Miller-Stokes" problem of very limited within-district sample sizes. However, during the 2000 election, two polling firms did extensive polling over the course of the campaign, enough to give us reasonable survey sizes per district and coverage over a large number of districts, thereby circumventing the standard problems of small within-district samples and poor cross-district coverage. Knowledge Networks conducted political polling during the course of the campaign, and the Annenberg National Election Study conducted extensive interviews, both in the form of panels around major campaign events (i.e., the New Hampshire and Iowa primaries, Super Tuesday, the conventions, etc.), as well as a rolling cross-section during the course of the campaign. While both surveys asked a variety of political items (and they asked different items to different respondents), they both th Congressional district (located in the hills near Midland) the second-most conservative district in the nation.
In order to incorporate the survey data into our model, we proceed as follows. For the 1992-2000 data, we let w i be the mean liberal-conservative position in the district, and σ 2 w i be the sampling variance of w i , equal to the variance of the w i divided by the sample size in district i, n i . The mean survey response is modeled as a function of district partisanship in 2000, i.e., w i ∼ N (η − x i , σ 2 w i ), where η is an intercept parameter to be estimated. Note that the factor loading or discrimination on district partisanship is implicitly set to -1.0. In this way we are letting the information in the survey data contribute heavily to the substantive content of the recovered preference measures, giving our measure more construct validity as a measure of "district ideology" than relying solely on district level vote shares.
Because the survey data is strongly correlated with vote outcomes (see above), our measure of district preferences is extremely similar to our measure of district partisanship. The relationship between the two sets of measures is show in Figure 9 . Unsurprisingly, Republican-held seats (red dots) are predominantly more conservative/Republican on both measures, while again there appears to be a pronounced skew in the Democratic tail of the distribution of district partisanship.
As one would expect from figure 9, the two measures correlate extremely highly: the posterior means of the district preferences and district partisanship measures correlate at 0.99, suggesting that according to this model, aggregate district partisanship and preferences are extremely strongly related-even if the micro-level relationship is far weaker. We wish to stress, however, that the strong relationship between our two estimates does not make this additional measure a superfulous exercise. First, the survey data means that the substantive content of the measures differs. Additionally, the fact that the posterior means do not change very much largely stems from the fact that in the 1990s the survey-based ideology measure is very highly correlated with the vote-based measures. Additionally, adding another source of information boosts reliability, reducing ex-post uncertainty about each district's partisanship.
Moreover, the primary substantive point of this exercise was to show how to incorporate additional information into this type of model. As we have shown here, the researcher can easily tailor our model to suit his/her specific substantive needs by adding additional indicators of district partisanship (or even in this case, "district ideology."). The model's flexibility is one of its primary strengths. 
